Azerbaijan-Iran relations: from a turkish think tank

Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: ‘One Nation Two States’ or ‘Enemy Brothers’ Azerbaijani and Iranian leaders often utter the motto of ‘one nation two states’ like those Turkish and Azerbaijani prime ministers and presidents to refer how strong and natural the good relationships between their respective governments and nations. The motto between Baku and Tehran takes its root from the fact that independent Azerbaijan was once part of Iranian state before Russian invasion in early 19th century and the presence of an estimated over 20 million Azerbaijani Turks living in Iran today. As it was during the 1990s, the relationships between the two states have been to a large extent influenced by the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. Baku has always overtly or covertly expected Iran to pay more attention while developing relations with Armenia to the sensitivity that Azerbaijani government and Azerbaijani Turks have shown on that issue. As if unaware of what Azerbaijan was saying, Iran has continuously pursued its regional interests mainly shaped and influenced by the problematic relations between Tehran and capitals of western states, particularly Washington, D.C. This has then placed the two states, Azerbaijan and Iran, in a confined space in which almost all sorts of their relations are managed in an atmosphere of natural and constant tension.

Even though Iran seems to have been far away from being more considered towards Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, it should be accepted that the links between Baku and Tehran have been developed on yearly basis. To be more precise, constant development of the relationships between the two is in fact caused more by out of necessity rather than by out of their genuine will for cooperation. That is why the more they initiate new cooperation the more they get stuck in to new problems. For instance, Baku and Tehran signed an agreement on the opening of consulate general offices in Tabriz in Iran and Nachichevan region of Azerbaijan when Azerbaijan Popular Front was in power in Azerbaijan. While Azerbaijan allowed Iran to do so in Nakhichevan, Tehran did not deliver the same to Azerbaijan for a long time up until October 2004. And yet, Iranian government gave a green light in January 2008 to Armenia to open its own consulate general in the same Azerbaijani city of Tabriz, a political move which has very much frustrated Baku to this day.

A similar type of problem is nowadays being seen on the issue of mutual visa exemption of the citizens of both countries during their travels to each other. Iran unilaterally removed the visa requirement in November 2009 for Azerbaijanis when they visit to Iran and expects the same move from Azerbaijani government for Iranians. Azerbaijan has however been reluctant to follow the wishes of the Iranian side due to latter’s problematic relations with the United States, possible challenges of the presence of unchecked and free Iranians in the country and warm relations between Tehran and Yerevan.

Economic relations have also displayed a problematic picture between the two states. Despite the fact that both countries have big potential for economic cooperation, they seems to have been unable to exploit it. Azerbaijan’s trade volume with Iran has always stayed behind the one it has had with either Russia or Turkey or Europe since 2001.

Especially the development of energy resources in the Caspian and their transportation pipelines was and today is an economic area that could have been the bulk of trade between the two sides. This means that development of energy resources of Azerbaijan including related pipelines which are evolved around economic gains and strategic interests has impacted greatly the way each sees the other. Azerbaijan granted less shares to Iran in the development of its oil and gas projects in the Caspian than those of the western energy companies during both Azerbaijan Popular Front and Heydar Aliyev governments. Even Heyday Aliyev called off % 5 share of the Iranian National Oil Company in the development of Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil deposits and gave it to the Exxon company of the US due to the problems between Washington and Tehran. But, having known the strategic importance of Iran, Aliyev granted % 10 share to it for the development of Shah Deniz gas deposits. And yet this move by Azerbaijan remained far short for satisfying Iran and became one of the important reasons why Tehran has always looked the governments of Heydar Aliyev and his successor, Ilham Aliyev, the son of late President, very suspiciously.

Neither was the decision of the transportation of Azerbaijani oil and gas resources to international markets taken very easily. Like Turkey and Russia, Iran, too, strived long for having those lines via its territory. Iran insisted that main oil pipeline from ACG would have been much cheaper if it had gone to either Persian Gulf or Ceyhan port of Turkey via Iranian territory. However, all major actors, like the governments of Azerbaijan and the US and Turkey, as well as western oil companies, did not pay much attention to the Iranian option and offers. So, the line that, at the end, appeared as the main oil pipeline named Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), followed such a direction that it not only avoided Iranian territory but also deprived Tehran of its economic and strategic benefits. More specifically, such a development meant that Iran would never ever be able to have economic and political means of main oil pipeline that could provide for Tehran with an important leverage over Azerbaijan. Therefore, Iran has always seen that so long as they did not have any important control mechanism against Baku, independent Azerbaijan would get richer and richer in economic terms carrying the potential danger of stirring up Southern Azerbaijani-Turkish ethnic consciousness in Iran- a fear of Tehran that would perhaps come out in the form of more secessionist demands of Azerbaijanis.

Of course all those above do not mean that there is no energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Tehran. Yes there is, but that cooperation presents such a volume that it cannot be considered strategic. For instance, the two states made a gas swap deal in 2004 for next 25 years period by which Azerbaijan would supply 250 million cubic metres of natural gas to northeastern Iran while Iran was to do the same for Nakhichevan region of Azerbaijan. Also, Iran is willing to provide natural gas for the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Although Iranian participation to Nabucco would give a new impetus to restore the relationships between Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, increasing sanctions and pressure of the US against Tehran in international level seems not to let it happen in a short and mid- term.

Alltogether, mainly the dissatisfaction of Iran with the energy and pipeline developments in the Caspian and ‘natural tension’ due to the Southern Azerbaijan issue, have time to time brought Baku and Tehran head to head. One of the examples of these is Iran’s opposition to the delimitation of Caspian water reservoir and sub-soil resources offered by Azerbaijan and some other littoral states. It was this adamant position of Iran that led to the expulsion of seismic research ship of BP-Amaco by Iranian fighter jets and warships in 2001 in the southern part of the Capian over the disputed Araz-Alov-Sharg oil fields. Again, they agreed in 2005 that neither side would permit any third party state to use their respective territories for a military attack directed against the other side. Yet this has still been far away from dispelling security concern of both states posed against each other. It can be said that ongoing status dispute of the Caspian could ignite a flare between the two states, while Iran, the strongest side, is sometimes accused of violating Azerbaijani airspace by fighter jets and helicopters.

Worsening realtionship between Baku and Tehran is also caused by each sides’ search for immediate security support in different, and many ways often opposing, centres in the world. In order to alleviate the security threat posed by the US and Israel, Iran has been developing warm strategic relations with Russia and China. Energy rich Azerbaijan, which sees the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Armenia the biggest security problem, has not only earmarked considerable sum of money for defence purposes but also developed relations with Israel and the US in military, technological and economic areas. Today, though Azerbaijan has still refrained from opening an embassy in Israel because of the possible wrath of Iran over such a development, Baku’s increasing links and cooperation with Tel Aviv appears to have still been enough to make Tehran very outraged.

Thus, the Azerbaijani-Iranian relationships has continued in an environment in which there is a ‘constant’ or ‘natural’ tension caused foremost by the issue of divided Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s desire to overcome the urgent security threat posed by Armenia has pushed Baku to develop closer relations with Israel and the US. Iran has seen this as a development that cannot be compromised, and looked for alternative tools to control, and if possible weaken, the hands of Azerbaijan. Iran has done it mainly by both developing economic and startegic relationships with Armenia, and staying indifferent to Azerbaijan’s calls for a just solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. So, all these tell that the relationships between Azerbaijan and Iran more resemble the behaviour of ‘enemy brothers’ rather than of ‘one nation’.